The evolution of agricultural reforms in China by Yamamoto, Hiromi
Title The evolution of agricultural reforms in China
Author(s)Yamamoto, Hiromi







WORKING PAPER NO. 52
THE EVOLUTION OF AGRICULTURAL REFORMS 
             IN CHINA 
            Hiromi Yamamoto 
         Graduate School of Economics 




Graduate School of Economics 




THE EVOLUTION OF AGRICULTURAL REFORMS 
             IN CHINA 
            Hiromi Yamamoto 
         
-Graduate School of Economics 
              Kyoto University
August, 2001
       THE EVOLUTION OF AGRICULTURAL REFORMS IN CHINA 
                            Hiromi Yamamoto 
               Graduate School of Economics,Kyoto University 
                Yoshida-Hommachi, Sakyo-ku, Kyoto, Japan 
                  E-mail:yamamoto@econ.kyoto-u.ac.jp 
I Introduction 
  This article examines post-1978 agricultural reforms in China . Section II analyzes 
the marketization process of agricultural sector under the softliners' agricultural 
reforms during the 1978-1989 period. Section III looks at reforms under the hardliners 
during the 1989-2000 period. Section IV analyzes agricultural price policy in terms of 
the terms of trade between industry and agriculture. In Section V I estimate the total 
factor productivity index (TFPI) in agricultural sector and introduce a policy cycle with 
the TFPI. Section VI discusses the grain trade problem in China , while Section VII 
discusses the recent agricultural industrialization problem in China . Finally Section 
VIII discusses foregoing issues for the state and the market in China's agriculture.
II Agricultural Reforms under the Deng Xiaoping Regime 
A The marketization process of the rural economy 
  Deng Xiaoping recovered from his downfall and took the power from Hua Guofeng at 
the Third Plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party(CCP) held 
in December of 1978. This plenum approved the 'Decisions concerning Some Problems 
on Accelerating Agricultural Develop ment(Draft)"' and the "Regulations of People's 
Commune (Draft)"'. The former draft proposed a new price policy, that is, an increase in 
government procurement prices of agricultural products and a decrease in modern 
inputs for agriculture, improving the terms of trade between the agricultural and the 
industrial sector. It also included unchanged consumer prices of grains and the 
stabilization of prices of sidedishes. 
  At the same time both drafts approved 'distribution according to work' in stead of 
'malegalitarian distribution' which was caused by the work points system created b
y 
famous Dazhai People's Commune in Jiyang county of Shanxi province during the 
Great Cultural Revolution. The Party Committee of Jiyang county governing Dazhai 
People's Commune criticized the ` Learning Movement from Dazhai' in the People's Daly 
on October 3, 1979.3 The policy of `distribution according to work' had led to the 
introduction of agricultural responsibility systems, which evolved into the household 
responsibility system which caused the decollectivization of People's Communes.4 
  The first document of the Party in 1983, "Some Problems on Present Rural Economic
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Policies"' admitted the bao gan dao hu system,i. e., the same household responsibility 
system as the fixed rental system, allowing the peasant employ seven workers at 
maximum in farming and engage in business in transporting and selling agricultural 
products by tractors, tracks, and ships owned by them. 
  The first document of the Party in 1984, the" Notice on Rural Work in 1984"' allowed 
the peasant lease out their contracted farmland by an onerous contract while it 
admitted that the lease duration of farmland should be extended from one to three to 
more than 15 years. 
  It also insisted that regional economic cooperative organizations (RECOs) should 
provide peasants with social services. Social services meant having total charge over 
land and contracts, managing irrigation facilities and farm machinery, implementing 
plant protection and securing the prevention of epidemics, teaching and diffusing 
science and technology, maintaining irrigation systems and improving land, and 
providing other services before and after production. 
  RECOs are in fact good so as to manage public goods such as land, water, farm 
machinary, and R&D and so on. They can play an important role in avoiding market 
failures which are caused by public goods. This concept of the RECO was worked out by 
the Zhao Ziyang administration. But it faded out with the decline of General Secretary 
Zhao because of the Tian'anmen Incident on June 4, 1989. However, it seems that this 
idea still survives in the two-tier management system (shuangceng jingying zhi) where 
the collective economy provides peasants with social services under the household 
responsibility system. 
B. The introduction of market mechanism 
  The market mechanism was in fact introduced into the economy in 1984. It gave the 
peasants such strong the incentives for production that grain production made a record 
level of 400 million tons in 1984(see Table 1). 
  The first document of the Party in 1985, " Ten Policies To Revitalize Rural Economy 
Furthermore"' approved the abolishment of the government procurement system for 
grains, the adoption of the contract purchasing system for grains, and peasant's 
freedom of planting. Furthermore, it stressed the absorption of rural surplus labor by 
promoting township and village enterprises (TVEs), emphasizing for the first time 
industrial structural adjustment in rural areas. 
  The first document of the Party in 1986, " Arrangement of Rural Work in 1986"' 
stressed the development of farm households specialized in farming (zhuanyehu) by 
enhancing the concentration of farmland into devoted farmers. This led to the formation 




































































































































































































































Source: State Statistical Bureau, China Statistical Yearbook (various years)
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`Sparkling Plan' (xinghuo jihua)aiming at the application and diffusion of results of 
science and technology to develop high yield varieties, mass production technology, and 
processing technology in the field of agriculture. 
  In January 1987 the Political Bureau issued the document, "Deepen Rural 
Reform "'10 which emphasized creating the two-tier management system and stabilizing 
the household responsibility system.
III Agricultural Reforms under the Deng-Jiang Regime 
A. The Eighth Five-Year Plan(1991-95) 
  The two documents ofthe Party and the State Council issued in December 1990 and 
in November 1991, the "Notice on Agriculture and Agricultural Work in 1991" 11 and the 
"Decisions on Strengthening Agriculture and Agricultural Work Further"" put 
emphasis on promoting agricultural productivity by science and technology as well as 
constructing rural basic organizations. However, neither produced any new device on 
institutional reforms. 
  The State Council issued the "Decisions on Developing Agriculture of High 
Productivity, Good Quality, and High Efficiency (Summary)"13 in October 1992. The 
State Council issued the "Outline of Agricultural Development in the 1990s"14 in July 
1993 saying that each province should basically self-supply grains while it should bring 
up foodgrain production bases and intend to diffuse high yield varieties. At the same 
time the Agricultural Law" mirroring the Agricultural Basic Law in Japan was issued. 
This law stresses protecting peasant's rights and refers to the reform of grain 
distribution system. 
  In 1992the government was determined to carry out the new reform of the grain 
distribution system." In this reform the government aimed at solving the budget deficit 
problem by raising consumers' prices up to producers' prices of grains, and decided to 
carry out two-tier management of grains at the central and provincial governments. The 
central government ceased to play a very important role of redistributing grains for the 
local governments while retaining the responsibilities for grain trade and the buffer 
stocks of grains for grain price stabilization. On the other hand, each local government 
should also have responsibilities for its annual balance of demand and supply for grains 
and buffer stocks within its territory. The State Council adopted the ` protective price' 
system, what is called the guaranteed price system. It is true that the government 
transformed the direct grain management system into an indirect one. But the 
government still keeps the dual-track system of grain prices. 




  The Fifth Plenum of the 14th Central Committee of the CCP in September 1995 
adopted the "Proposal on the Ninth Five-Year Plan and the Decision of the Long-Term 
Targets." "And based on this proposal Premier Li made the ."Report on the Outline of 
Ninth Five-Year Plan for the National Economy and Social Economic Development 
and the Long-Term Targets to the Year 2010"18 at the Fourth Session of the NPC in 
March 1996. In this report, the foodgrain production target is 490 million tons while the 
target of 500 million tons is pulled down to that of "efforts". Main points of the Ninth 
Five-Year Plan are as follows: (1) to guarantee the stable production increase in major 
crops such as grains, cotton, oil seed and so on; (2) to bring the agricultural productivity 
into the new level of production; (3) to guarantee increasing peasants' revenues, and 
raise their living standard into a stable level; and (4) to take agricultural productivity, 
the rural economy and the peasants' revenues into a new stage up to 2000. 
  In light of food problem the Plan stressed the following points: (1) to protect 
farmland according to law, to clear land, to increase the multiple cropping index so as to 
stabilize the planted area of grains in the long run; (2) to develop agricultural 
infrastructure(mainly irrigation), increase the effective irrigated areas, diffuse the 
technology of saving water, and enlarge the field of high productivity; (3) to accelerate 
improvement of low and medium productivity land, to construct foodgrain production 
bases if conditions of the land are good; (4) to strengthen agricultural promotion by 
science education, develop agriculture of high productivity, good quality, and high 
efficiency, and improve varieties; and (5) to develop industry of modern inputs, construct 
and improve chemical fertilizer factories, and supply much more agricultural films and 
machinery. 
  Agricultural industrializaion. aiming at enlarging the scale of operation has began in 
provinces such as Shandong and Zhejiang. At last in January 1996 the People's Daily 
contained an editorial that promoted agricultural industrialization so that the 
government would promote it all the more." 
C. Agricultural reforms under the Jiang-Zhu regime 
  On February 19, 1997 Deng Xiaoping, great grand designer of economic reforms died 
before the return of sovereignty of Hong Kong to China on July 1 in the same year he 
wanted to watch there. At the 15th Party Congress in September of the same year, 
Chairman Jiang Zemin made a speech 2' about building socialism with the Chinese 
characteristics following the theory of Deng Xiaoping. In this speech he pointed out that 
China would be in the first stage, and stressed on strengthening the basic position of 
agriculture, adjusting and optimizing the economic structure, insisting the development 
of agriculture with high yield, high quality, and high efficiency as well as with the
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saving of water. 
  Premier Li Peng made the "Report on the Work of the Government"" at the Fifth 
Session of the Eighth NPC in March 1997. The report stressed some points about 
agriculture as follows: 
(1) The government should keep it in mind that foodgrain production after the rich 
   crop in 1996 should not decrease. 
(2) The government should carry out reform of the foodgrain distribution system, 
   improve the protective price system, and strengthen the grain harvests and the 
   buffer stocks. 
(3) Based on the principle of the "one main root and many other roots" the government 
   should make the state-owned grain enterprise sector a major organization and 
   make large grain consumers, cooperatives for purchases and sales, agriculture, 
   reclamation work etc., suborganizations, thereby revitalizing the grain distribution 
   system. 
 (4) The government should maintain the governor responsibility system for the "rice 
   bag" (midaizi shengzhang zerenzhi) and the mayor responsibility system for the 
 "vegetable basket." (cailanzi shizhang zerenzhl) 
  New Premier Zhu Rongi made it clear at a press interview held by the First Session 
of the Ninth NPC that he would promote three objectives, that is, state enterprise 
reform, financial reform, and administrative reform at the press putting the reform of 
grain distribution system first among the five reforms." Government grain stockpiles in 
China amounted to the historic level owing to the rich harvests during the 1995-97 
period. Since it led to a big budgetary burden, the government would need the further 
reform. The State Council enacted the Grain Purchasing Regulations" in June 1998 
saying that only state grain enterprises are allowed to purchase grains directly from 
peasants at protective prices. Therefore, private merchants are forbidden to buy grains 
in the rural areas. 
  Premier Zhu Rongji made the "Report on the Work of the Government"24 at the 
Second Session of the Ninth NPC in March 1999. In this report he stressed the 
establishment of two-tier management system based on the household responsibility 
system under the sprit of the Party in the Third Plenum of the 15th Central Committee 
of the CCP. He also stressed an increase in modern inputs, the overall development of 
agriculture and the rural economy, and an increase in revenues of peasants. In order to 
achieve these objectives, he raised the following five points: 
  (1) to adjust and optimize the agricultural structure. Many agricultural products are 











  stabilize the total amount of grain production and increase the foodgrain 
  production of higher grade. 
(2) to consolidate the agricultural infrastructure based on irrigation. 
(3) to revitalize the distribution of agricultural produce by promoting the reform of 
  the foodgrain distribution system positively. The government was to accomplish 
  the deepening of the state enterprise reform as well as the three-point policy, i. e., 
  for the government to make unlimitedly purchases of surplus grains from 
  peasants at the protective prices, for the state grain enterprises to sell grains at 
  the prices on. the regular spread, and the unification of funds purchasing the 
  agricultural produce 
(4) to make the structural adjustment of the TVEs and promote constructing small 
  cities. 
(5) to alleviate the burdens of peasants and maintain the stability of villages.
IV. The Changes in Agricultural Price Policy 
  The changes in the terms of trade between industry and agriculture during the 
1950-77 period are depicted in Table 2 and Figure 1. The terms of trade index(TTI) 
drastically decreased from 100.0 in 1952 to 52.5 in 1977. This fact shows that prices of 
agricultural products increased compared with those of industrial products. Generally 
speaking, in socialist countries prices of industrial goods were set higher than those of 
agricultural goods. This is due to the primitive socialist capital accumulation process, 
as mentioned by a Russian economist Preobrazhensky.25 The government keeps the 
prices of foodgrains as wage-goods so low that the industrial sector can make the 
wage rates low. The industrial sector can keep the prices of capital goods high to gain 
high profits. The high profits enable the industrial sector to invest in reproduction on 
an expanded scale. This is what is called classical economic growth theory. 
  China, however, slowly raised the prices of agricultural products to give the 
peasants incentives for production until the beginning of the agricultural reforms in 
1978. But most of the increase in grain production was absorbed by the increase in 
population. This showed the Multhusian trap which had been predicted by Ma Yinchu, 
President of Beijing University in the 1950s.26 Mao Zedong's thought that the more 
population would assist economic development brought about this Multhusian trap. 
  Table 2 and Figure 1 followed that the TTI declined 18.0 percent from 50.5 in 1978 
to 41.4 in 1979. It was Deng Xiaoping's new price policy that resulted in such effect. 
The TTI decreased to 33.7 in 1985 when the market mechanism was formally 
introduced into the Chinese economy. Furthermore, the TTI declined during the
-7-





Price Index for Urban 

















































































































































 General Farm and 




















































 Products Rural 
    Retail








































































































  Source: State Statistical Bureau, Statistical yearbook of China ( various years). 
  Notes: 1. All indices are 100 in 1950. 
         2. Figures in parenthesesshow growth rates. 
         3. The general consumer price index for urban areas before 1978 is from living cost. index of workers and 
           stuff. 
         4. Terms of Trade is the ratio of the rural and retail price index of overall industrial products to the 
           purchasing price index of general farm and sideline products.
i
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Fig. 1 Terms of Trade between the Industrial and Agricultural Sectors, 1950-98 
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1986-88 period. However, the increase of the TTI from 29.6 in 1989 to 33.4 in 1991 
brought about inflationary pressures. That is to say, the Chinese conomy faced the 
wage-price spiral. According to Table 2 and Figure I the increasing rate of general 
retail price index was almost the same as that of the general consumer price 
index(GCPI) as a wage index during the 1978-84 period. But the latter surpassed the 
former during 1985-97 with exceptions of 1989 and 1990. This shows that the 
government cannot determine the terms of trade between industry and agriculture 
independent of the determination of the wage rate in,the industrial sector. 
  Table 2 and Figure 1 showed that the TTI went up during the 1997-99 period, 
favoring the agricultural sector. Furthermore, the growth rate of the GCPI showed 0.8 
percent in 1997 and -2.6 percent in 1998 so that the Chinese economy was clearly in a 
phase of deflation. The index of agricultural purchase prices in Table 2 was -4.5 
percent in 1997 and -8.0 percent in 1998, showing deflation. This was clear evidence 
that China had already entered into the age of overproduction in the agricultural 
sector. 
  Price reform in China has been making a rapid progress. According to Table 3 and 
Figure 2, as of 1997 the share of agricultural products traded with market prices to 
the total agricultural produce in value terms reached 80.5 percent. At the same time 
the share of the retailed commodities traded with market prices to the total retailed 
commodities reached 93.2 percent while the share in the case of production materials 
81.6 percent. 
   China finds it necessary to lower domestic prices of foodgrains which are already 
higher than international prices in order to join the WHO. At the moment China is at 
a turning point in the adoption of structural adjustment policy rather than price 
policy.
V. Agricultural Production and Policy Cycle 
A. The estimation of total factor productivity index in China'.s agriculture 
  I estimated the total factor productivity index (TFPI) in agricultural sector in 
China in Table 4 and Figure 3. Figure 4 shows factor inputs in China's agriculture. 
My method of estimation is essentially based on Tang." Tang's data are all from the U. 
S. government data. They are estimated from fragmented ata of the Chinese origins. 
However, all the data that I used are from the Chinese statistics. 
  The TFPI in 1978 before the agricultural reform was 95.69 compared with 100.00 
in 1952. Agricultural reform increased the TFPI from 99.70 in 1978 to 124.18 in 1984, 
when the market mechanism was in fact introduced into the Chinese economy. After
-11-
Table 3 Composition of Three Kind 
      1990-97
s of Prices in the Marketization of the Economy, 
                              (unit%)
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Total Retail GPPs 29.8 20.9 5.9 4.8 7.2 8.8 6.3 5.5
Sales of GGPs 17.2 10.3 5.1 1.4 2.4 2.4 1.2 1.3
Consumer Goods MPs 53.0 68.8 93.0 90.4 90.4 88.8 92.5 93.2
Total Purchases of GPPs 25.0 22.2 12.5 10.4 16.6 17.0 16.9 16.1
Agricultural GGPs 23.4 20.0 5.7 2.1 4.1 4.4 4.1 3.4
Products MPs 51.6 57.8 81.8 87.5 79.3 78.6 79.0 80.5
Total Sales of GPPs 44.6 36.0 18.7 13.8 14.7 15.6 14.0 13.6
Producer Goods GGPs 19.0 18.3 7.5 5.1 5.3 6.5 4.9 4.8
MPs 36.4 45.7 73.8 81.1 80.8 81.1 81.1 81.6
Source Zhongguo Wujia Nianjin Bianjibu (The Editing Section of the P 
     China), The Price Yearbook of China 1998, 1998. 
Notes: 1. GPPs stand for Government Procurement Prices. 
     2. GGPs stand for Government Guidance Prices. 
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Notes: 1.The estimation method depends on Tang, A. M., An Analytical and Empirical Investigation
-14-
ofAgriculture in Mainland China, 1952-1980, Taipei: Chung-Hua Institution of Economic Research, 1984. 
2. The G`AO data at the 1980 prices during 1949-1986 are taken from Zhongguo Nongcun Jingi Tongi Dachuan 
1949-1986 (Planning Section, Ministry of Agriculture ed., Chinese Rural Economic Statistics, Beijing: 
Noyechubannsha 1986). Also the GVAO data are taken from Statistical Yearbook of China and Rural Statistical 
Yearbook of China (various years). And 1 estimated the GVAO data at the 1990 prices. Other data are also taken 
from statistical Yearbook of China (various years). Land input means total planted area, labor input the number of 
workers in the primary industry, and capital input total horsepower of farm machinery plus large domestic 
animals in terms of horsepower where a Large domestic animal is equivalent with o.52 horsepower. Current input 
stands for chemical and organic fertilizers applied. The estimation method of current inputs depends on Tang's 
one. The calculation method of aggregate input is as follows: 0.25( land input index) + 0.50 (labor Input index) + 
0.1(capital input index) + 0.15( current input index), where the distribution rate for land, labor, capital, and 
current inputs are 0.25, 0.50, 0.10, and 0.15 respectively.
--15-
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that the TFPI was stagnant until 1991 and increased to 168.31 in 1996 which was a 
post-1952 historic record since 1952. Then the TFPI declined to 167.78 in 1997 and to 
164.37 in 1998. It is true that the marketization process of agricultural sector in 
China increased the TFPI. However, it is also clear that the TFPI had ups and 
downs. Here I would like to estimate a policy cycle from the TFPI. 
  The annual growth rate of the TFPI during the period of 1952-98 is 1.086 percent 
which is not so high enough for sustainable growth. The contribution rate of the TFP 
for production is calculated as the annual growth rate of the TFPI to that of labor 
productivity. It is 24.35 percent, a figure which is low compared with advanced 
countries. China stresses that it should raise the contribution rate to the higher level 
of 60 percent in the long run.28 
B. The estimation of policy cycle 
  It is true that political affairs and the changes in economic policies said above 
brought about a policy cycle. Tang29 found a policy cycle in the agricultural sector in 
China. The production function Tang used to find the policy cycle is as follows: 
Yc= 106.530 - 6.607D 1 - 3.155D2 - 0.415X 
where Yc=TFPI 
       D1= dummy variable for a poor crop 
       D2=dummy variable for a averagecrop 
       X = time trend for technical progress 
  If influences of the weather and technical change are eliminated from the 
estimated TFPI, the residuals change with changes in economic policies. 
In terms of weather whether a crop is poor or rich or averaged depends on the data on 
damaged areas from natural disaster and the gross value of agricultural output 
(GVAO). Furthermore, the three-year moving average of the residuals is taken in 
order to eliminate the random component of the residuals. 
  Looking at the policy cycle, the centralization of power such as the First Five-Year 
Plan, the Socialist Reform, the Great Leap Forward Movement, the Great Cultural 
Revolution, the Pi Lin Pi Kong Movement, and the ascent of the Gang of Four led to 
decreased productivity. On the other hand, the decentralization of power such as the 
Land Reform, and the policy of "readjustment" led to increased productivity. 
  But Tang's regression results have the following problems: 
(1) The sign of coefficient of technical progress is negative. 
(2) Most calculations are made mainly from the data from the U. S. government. 
(3) The estimation period is the 1952-80 period, not including the Deng Xiaoping era. 
With this in mind, I estimated the TFPI from the Chinese statistics and arrived at a
-18-
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new equation. My estimation of the equation is as follows. 
 Ye = 97.482 -11.661D 1- 8.837D2 + 0.970X 
     (19.210) (-2.447) (-1.882) (6.630) 
   R2 = 0.562 
    D. W. = 0.392 
  However, figures in parenthesis under the coefficients stand 'fort -values. R2 
stands for the adjusted coefficient of determination. D. W. stands for Durbin-Watson 
statistic. The result of estimation is not statistically sufficient. However, the policy 
cycle induced from this equation shows the same result as Tang. Figure 5 shows the 
policy cycle I estimated. 
  Looking at the policy cycle, hardliners' centralization of power such as the First 
Five-Year Plan, the Socialist Reform, the Great Leap Forward Movement, the Great 
Cultural Revolution, the Pi Lin Pi Kong Movement, and the ascent of the Gang of 
Four, the Tian'anmen Incident led to decreased productivity. On the other hand, 
softliners' decentralization of power such as the Land Reform, the policy of 
readjustment, and the economic reform and the agricultural reform by Deng Xiaoping 
resulted in increased productivity. 
  It is noteworthy that the productivity turned upward since 1981 and that the 
policy cycle reached to the highest level in 1996. This fact shows that the 
liberalization in agricultural policy under the Deng regime made the TFPI go up. 
However, it should be noted that the productivity turned down in 1997. This 
downturn of the productivity was due to the fact that the government could not help 
adopting the governor responsibility system for the rice bag and the mayor 
responsibility system for the vegetable basket when it faced deflation and agricultural 
overproduction, and the terms of trade unfavorable to the agricultural sector.
VI. Grain Trade in China 
A. The trend of grain trade 
  Table 5 shows the trend of grain trade in China. In terms of grain imports wheat is 
the major import grain. On the other hand, rice is the major import grain. Mah3o 
proposes an interesting hypothesis of the policy of ` fair price' about China's grain 
trade, saying that China exports rice while it imports wheat. Because the 
international price of rice is always higher than that of wheat so that China can 
import a lot of wheat with the foreign exchange earning from the export of rice. 
 The net import of grains showed negative during the 1952-55 period and during the 
1956- 60 period. After 1960 it turned positive every year, getting to a high level of
I
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 14.87million tons in 1982. It showed negative both in 1985 and in 1986. It recorded 
 the highest level of 18.67 million tons in 1995, decreasing to 10. 25 million tons in 
 1996. On the contrary, it showed negative both in 1997 and in 1998. This fact suggest 
 that China is now in a position of oversupply of grains. 
    The net import cost of grains basically showed the sign of plus for many years 
 while it showed the sign of plus in 1985 and 1986, and during1992-94 and 1997-98. 
 What are major causes to determine the grain trade mentioned above in China? 
 Here I estimated the import function of grains and the export function of rice 
 respectively in order to show Mah's hypothesis. 
    The import function of grains is estimated as follows. 
   log M= 0.705 + 0.684 log( PW / Pr) + 0.7511ogGDP 
       (0.430) (3.579) (3.505) 
       R2 =0.369 
        D.W. = 1.171 
 Where M= the import of grains (unit: 10 thousand tons) 
        PW = the price index of wheat produced in theU. S. (1990=100.0) 
        Pr = the price index of rice in Beijing(1990=100.0) 
        GDP = the index of the real GDP in China(1990 constant price) 
        Figures in parenthesis are t-values. The period of estimation is 1972-98 
     In this estimation the coefficient of the relative price Pw / Pr is significant at the 5 
   percent level and shows that the elasticity of the relative price with the import of
   grains is not elastic, being less elastic than that of GDP. 
         On the other hand, the export function of rice is estimated as follows. 
   E= 272.542 + 0.019(Pr / PW) - 0.6520 -1.008Y 
      (5.586) (0.315) (-4.120) (-3.061) 
      R2--0.659 
      D.W.=1.583 
 Where E= the export of rice (unit: 10 thousand tons) 
        Pr = the price index of rice in Beijing (1990=100.0) 
        PW = the price index of wheat produced in the U. S.(1990=100.0) 
         C= real net imported costs 
         Y= rice production in the previous year 
     The period of estimation is 1974-98. C is the net importing costs in terms of yuan 
 deflated by the general retail price index in China. This estimated equation is not 
statistically significant. However, coefficient fills its sign condition and is significant at 
the one percent level.
- 22-
I
i  Both results of estimation may prove that Mah's hypothesis is still effective in 
explaining the grain trade pattern in China. 
B. The great transformation of grain trade policy 
  In 1995 Du Lunsheng who was a thinker in the Zhao Ziyang administration said 
China might import grains of 30-35 million tons or even up to 40 million tons at 
maximum in the near future. 31 This prediction was based on the fact that as the 
Chinese food consumption pattern changed the consumption of meat increased so 
much that China had to import grains as feed of domestic animals. 
  According to Nihon keizai shimbun on February 9, 2000, the State Council 
abolished its grain self-supply policy, saying that it would become the net importer of 
grains. Total imports of grains in China in 1999 amounted to 7.71 million tons, 
increasing by 9 percent from 1998. Of this total the import of soybean amounted to 
4.32 million tons, recording a 49.4 percent increase compared with the previous year. 
On the other hand, total exports of grains in 1999 decreased 16.3 percent to 7.58 
million tons. Therefore, the balance of grain trade was the net imports of 130 
thousand tons. 
  The rich harvest every year after 1996 in China enabled the government o 
provide itself with the sufficient stockpiles of grains while it led to the decrease in 
grain prices. As a result, the government was obliged to take policy measures of the 
protective price to make the market intervention so that the fiscal burdens of the 
government rapidly increased. 
  China will haveto open its domestic market to join the WTO. China has been 
giving peasants incentives for production by raising prices of agricultural produce 
since 1978. So far, so good. China has changed from a country with a food shortage to 
one with a food surplus. This leads to producer prices of grains in China much higher 
than those in the world market. This indicates that China's agricultural price policy 
will reach its limit, requiring the government o carry out a structural adjustment 
policy in order to raise agricultural productivity. This is a short story for the 
government to determine the transformation of grain trade policy. 
VII. Toward the Agricultural Industrialization 
A. The theoretical foundations for the agricultural industrialization" 
   In 1993 the government tried to stress the policy of ` mao gong nong yi ti hua, than 
j a x ao y tiao long ( the unification of trade, manufacturing, and agriculture, the 
vertical integration of production, processing, and selling). Then the theory of the 
unification of agriculture and industry (TUAI) appeared. In 1992 Shandong province
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carried out the first experiment of the TUAI in China. The foundation of the TUAI is 
the development strategy of the unification of agriculture and industry establishing 
the leading industry and realizing the management of economies of scale based on the 
long tou qi ye (the major enterprise). There are some reasons why this strategy 
appeared: (1) the locomotion problem of agricultural development, (2) the excessive 
division of agriculture and industry, and the burdening of management with rules 
and regulations, (3) inefficiencies of the management of the peasant, and (4) the 
extension of the external economy. 
  The content of the unification of agriculture and industry is as follows:(1) 
specialization in production, (2) location and regionalization, (3) the unification of 
management, (4) socialization of services, and (5) the industrialization of 
management. 
  The significance and effects of the unification of agriculture and industry are as 
follows: (1) to support and aid the market entry of peasants, (2) to form a system of 
profit sharing within the agricultural and industrial organization, (3) to realize highly 
efficient agriculture by industrial structural adjustment, (4) to strengthen migration 
of peasants and accelerate the process of unifying urban and rural areas, and (5) to 
make farm management adopt modern technology and transform traditional 
agriculture. 
B. The model of the unification of agriculture and industry 
  There are several models about the UAI as follows: 
(1) the type of the ` longtou'(leading) enterprise: `gongsl (company)+ farm households 
A leading enterprise is a company or a collective enterprise. Looking at these 
companies or collective enterprises by industry, processing, transportation, and 
selling of agricultural produce is the central industry. A company or a collective 
enterprise forms an organic association with the production base and farm 
households by contract. Such a unified management aims at forming an economic 
community of risk sharing and profit sharing. The contract includes the term of the 
guaranteed purchase of agricultural products with the protective price. 
(2) the type of the leading industry : the leading industry + farm households 
This type aims at the 'yi ye yi xiang' (one industry one township) and the 'yi can yi 
pin'(one village one product). 
(3) the type of the intermediary organization: the association of production, 
processing, and sales of agricultural produce or the specialized cooperative 
association of agriculture + farm households 
  The UAI is a sort of the new two-tier management system. Although the process of
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the UAI is going on, there are several problems to be solved. the relationship between 
the diversification and simplification of forms and ownership of economic 
organizations, (2) the relationship between the management under economies of scale 
and agricultural development, and (3) the relationship between the ` longtou' and farm 
households, i. e., mainly the distribution of profit . 
  Generally speaking, it should be noted that local governments always attract 
industrial and commerce enterprises to invest in agriculture by preferential measures 
to encourage the UAI.
VIII. Concluding Remarks 
  Agricultural reforms starting with 1978 have adopted the price policy of raising 
prices of agricultural produce as a means of economic liberalization. It is not until 
1985 that the State Council formally changed the government procurement into the 
government contract purchase system, deciding to introduce the market mechanism. 
In the reform of grain distribution system in 1992 the government introduced the 
two-tier grain management system at the central and local governments, the buffer 
stock system and the protective price system. Rich grain harvests every year after 
1996 brought about overproduction, leading to the decrease in market prices of grains. 
At last the government had to put the protective price system into action. In addition 
to that, since 1996 the terms of trade between industry and agriculture have not 
favored of agricultural sector. These facts show the limitation of price policy. Now 
China should not rely on price policy but on structural adjustment policy, taking trade 
liberalization into account. Nevertheless, the State Council introduced the governor 
responsibility system for the rice bag to maintain the planted areas and the mayor 
responsibility system for the vegetable basket to keep the planted areas of vegetables. 
This shows that the government is going back to the planned economy in adopting 
administrative rather than price means. 
  In terms of organizational innovation, People's Communes was collapsed and the 
household responsibility system evolved into the two-tier management system aiming 
at the forming family farms. The two-tier management system is evolving into the 
UAI. 
   The industrialization of agriculture in China is a sort of the new two-tier 
management system and calls for the liberalization of farmland, labor,. and capital 
markets. The first agricultural census" in China in 1997 showed an interesting fact 
that part-time farm households mainly engaged in agriculture shared 33.57 percent 
of all farm households, sharing more than a half of full-time farm households. Given
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this fact, development of the labor market is the most essential to that of the 
agricultural sector in China. Thus the government should play a very important role 
of establishing a social safety net. At present China is not facing a food problem but a 
peasant problem that Schultz34 mentioned. The government should address itself to 
many issues regarding public goods, including R&D the RECOs should have carried 
out.
Notes 
(1)Zhongguo gongchandang(Chinese Communist Party)(1978). However, this 
document was not published in China. See Taiwan's Journal, Zhongguo yanjiu, No.9 
(1979). 
(2)Zhongguo gongchandang(1978). See Zhongguo yanjiu, No.9 (1979). 
(3)Renmin ribao(People's Daily) on Oct. 3, 1979. 
(4)Concerning the agricultural responsibility systems, see Yamamoto(1983). 
(5)Zhongguo gongchandang(1983). 
(6)Zhongguo gongchandang and Guowuyuan (State Council) (1984). 
(7) Zhongguo gongchandang and Guowuyuan(1985). 
(8)Zhongguo gongchandang and Guowuyuan(1986). 
(9)Zhao(1986). 
(10)Zhongguo gongchandang zhengzhiju(the Political Bureau of the CCP)(1987). 
(11) Zhongguo gongchandang and Guowuyuan(1990). 







(19)Editorial of Renmin ribao on Dec. 11, 1995. 
(20)Jian(1997). 
(21)Li(1997). 









(27)See Chap. Four of Tang(1984). 




(32)Based on Niu(1997). 
(33)Renmin ribao on Dec. 31,1997 and on Jan.12 and 20. 
(34)Schultz(1945).
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